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Abstract: This article explores the legal framework around the process of ‘default 
management’ and explains its significance in the setting of central clearing. Having 
contextualised the discussion by considering central counterparties (CCPs) as default 
managers, and examined the safe harbours that CCPs enjoy from various provisions of 
insolvency law, the article considers the legal challenges arising along a ‘default timeline’ 
consisting of three different stages: declaration of default; close out; and collateral 
management. It finds that even in the context of central clearing, where robust default 
management is now of systemic importance to the financial system and the law is generally 
supportive, material risks remain and must be accounted for. The article suggests that while 
some of these risks may be mitigated by the parties, others require action from legislators, so 
addressing the fragmentary nature of the framework governing CCP default management 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This article explores the legal framework around the process of ‘default management’ and 
explains its significance in the setting of central clearing. It finds that, even in a context 
where robust default management is of systemic importance to the financial system and the 
law is generally supportive, material risks remain and must be accounted for. 
One of the principal objectives of financial contracts is to allow creditors to manage a 
defaulting counterparty in a way which is effective, predictable and legally binding.  One way 
in which this is achieved is by affording creditors a suite of contractual rights when defined 
‘Events of Default’ are triggered. These events are amongst the most commonly negotiated 
terms of financial contracts and, as a minimum, include the non-payment of any sums due 
under the contract.1 While a breach of contract normally entitles the innocent party to claim 
for damages, an Event of Default triggers a predetermined contractual scheme allowing the 
non-defaulting party to take certain steps to protect itself. In the context of derivatives, for 
instance, this scheme will provide for early termination on the payment of a sum calculated 
by a method which may lead to the non-defaulting party paying the defaulter.2 To supplement 
these contractual protections, a creditor may take proprietary rights in its counterparty’s 
assets, often in the form of financial collateral such as cash or securities. These rights are 
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1 See section 3.1 infra for a review of commonly found Events of Default and the implications of this drafting.  
2 As was the case in Peregrine Fixed Income Ltd v Robinson Department Store Public Ltd [2000] C.L.C. 1328. 
At [24], Moore-Bick J (as he then was) notes of this potential for payment in either direction that it ‘clearly 
deprives the Event of Default of most of its characteristics as a breach of contract (…) there are no doubt good 
commercial reasons for doing so.’  
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intended to be enforceable against third parties and thereby transform a creditor’s position 
should the counterparty become insolvent.  
In practice, the rights associated with Events of Default are contingent not only on the 
provisions of the parties’ agreement but on a fuller and more complex set of public and 
private legal rules governing default management. Financial law is littered with examples 
where parties’ arrangements failed because such rules took precedence.3 Ex ante certainty 
about the law of default management is therefore vital. However, as this article demonstrates, 
this is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve in modern financial markets. In part this is 
because the applicable law is piecemeal and has been subject to significant recent change, for 
example as special resolution regimes have been introduced. At the same time, the process of 
managing a default is growing more demanding operationally, for example, sometimes 
requiring the non-defaulting party to close out increasingly large and complex portfolios 
composed of the defaulter’s positions. The ensuing tension between certainty and complexity 
matters for the counterparties themselves, but as we explain, there are also systemic concerns. 
Most pressingly, as this article will show, where regulators choose to promote safe and robust 
markets by requiring that certain private parties manage all the defaults that occur within a 
sector, this tension may have financial stability implications beyond the contracting parties 
themselves.  
Rather than considering financial contracts in the abstract, the context for this 
discussion is the legal framework which applies to the default processes used in central 
clearing. While this is a relatively specialist context, it is important, topical and, in terms of 
default management, paradigmatic. Central counterparties (CCPs) intermediate all the 
contracts in a particular market, offering various benefits4 but, above all, acting as ‘default 
managers’ for the markets which they clear. In the wake of the global financial crisis, 
regulators undertook a ‘deep revision of the regulation of the securities and derivatives 
markets’.5  The resulting reform promulgated CCPs, partly because of their proven capacity 
to act as default managers. Specifically, new rules have been implemented in the G20 and 
beyond to mandate the use of central clearing for certain over the counter (OTC) derivatives.6 
                                                          
3 For example, British Eagle International Airline Ltd v Cie National Air France  [1975] 1 WLR 758, HL. This 
case and other examples of clashes between contractual arrangements and mandatory law are discussed further 
in M Bridge and J Braithwaite, ‘Private Law and Financial Crises’ (2013) 13(2) Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 361.  
4 For a discussion of the effects of clearing from an economic perspective, see C Pirrong, ‘The Economics of 
Clearing: Theory and Practice’ (2011) ISDA Discussion Paper Number 1. 
5 G Ferrarini and P Saguato, ‘Reforming Securities and Derivatives Trading in the EU: From EMIR to MIFIR’ 
(2013) 13(2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 319, 319.  
6 ibid, 326−336 and see infra section 2.  
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The ability of CCPs to manage defaulting members safely and without contagion has 
therefore become a matter with system-wide implications. At the same time, extensive 
regulatory reforms have targeted both CCPs and their members, which are predominantly 
banks or investment firms,7 and these reforms have complicated the legal framework for 
CCPs managing defaults. One relevant EU Regulation, EMIR,8 acknowledges these risks, 
with Article 48 requiring, amongst other safeguards, that a ‘CCP shall verify that its default 
procedures are enforceable.’ In sum, CCPs offer a case study in the law of default 
management which incorporates common legal strategies and uncommon stakes.  
This article is organised as follows. As the analysis requires some background on 
clearing, section 2 explains how a CCP intermediates a cleared market and manages defaults, 
and it explores the legislative safe harbours which shield qualifying aspects of CCPs’ 
operations from certain legal rules.9 Section 3 then analyses the legal issues which arise along 
the course of a typical default timeline involving the declaration of default, close out and 
collateral management.10 Section 4 concludes, considering the implications of the analysis.  
 
2.  CCPs AS ‘DEFAULT MANAGERS’ 
 
The defining feature of a market which uses central clearing is that participants contract 
direct with the CCP rather than with each other, so that the CCP becomes buyer to every 
seller, and seller to every buyer.11 The principal advantages of central clearing arise from the 
CCP’s position as a hub in its market: participants no longer face the credit risk of a market 
counterparty; the CCP facilitates netting in the ordinary course of events; and, most 
                                                          
7 Including the special resolution regime provided for in the Banking Act 2009, discussed in section 3.1.3 infra.  
8 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories, widely 
referred to as the European Market Infrastructure Regulation or EMIR.  
9 The article focuses on English law, as this is widely used, not just by UK-based participants in the financial 
markets. We also consider EU law, as it applies in the UK. 
10 If the defaulter is also clearing on behalf of clients, Articles 48 of EMIR obliges CCPs to ‘trigger the 
procedures’ for transferring or porting those positions to another member. This article does not address client 
clearing or porting but for a discussion of the topic, see D Turing, Clearing and Settlement in Europe, 
(Bloomsbury Professional 2012) and L Gullifer, ‘Compulsory Central Clearing of OTC Derivatives’ in L 
Gullifer and S Vogenauer (eds), English and European Perspectives on Contract and Commercial Law: Essays 
in honour of Hugh Beale (Hart 2014), 387-403. 
11 For background on the process of central clearing generally, see D Murphy, OTC derivatives: Bilateral 
trading and central clearing (Palgrave Macmillan 2013); D Turing, ibid and A Rehlon and D Nixon, ‘Central 
counterparties: What are they, why do they matter and how does the Bank regulate them?’ [2013] Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin Q2.  
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importantly for these purposes, it holds financial resources allowing it to act as a shock 
absorber for the market if a participant fails.12   
While CCPs have been a long-standing part of the financial markets, as a result of 
extensive post-crisis regulatory reforms they have now assumed an unprecedented role in the 
global economy. This transformation was triggered by the G20’s statement in 2009,13 
following which regulators worldwide have already introduced, or are in the process of 
introducing, new laws requiring that eligible non-exchange traded or ‘over the counter’ 
(OTC) derivatives between qualifying counterparties have to be cleared through CCPs.14 In 
the EU, these reforms were implemented in 2012 by EMIR,15 and, in the US, by Title VII of 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act.16 The central objective of this clearing mandate is to reduce risk in 
the OTC derivatives markets.17 This policy outcome is, in turn, entirely dependent on CCPs 
being robust18 and being able to implement their default rules. Accordingly, the remainder of 
this section explains the legal nature of those rules, and considers their relationship with 
insolvency law.  
 
                                                          
12 Evidence of the ‘shock absorber’ effect in action was provided by the February 2010 evidence of 
LCH.Clearnet to the House of Lords EU Committee, stating that the losses caused by the failure of Lehman 
Brothers were covered by 35% of Lehman’s initial margin. See EU Committee, The future regulation of 
derivatives: Report with Evidence (HL 2009−10, 10) 93.  
13 G20 Leaders’ Statement (Pittsburgh 2009)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_2010-2014/president/pdf/statement_20090826_en_2.pdf>  
(All websites accessed 15 June 2016, unless otherwise stated). 
The statement covered a package of reforms for the OTC derivatives markets, including clearing, reporting and 
higher capital requirements for non-cleared derivatives, of which this article only addresses the first.  
14 For a summary of progress across multiple jurisdictions on the implementation of the central clearing 
commitment and other reforms to the derivatives markets, see Financial Stability Board, Ninth Progress Report 
on Implementation (24 July 2015). 
15 EMIR is part of a package of post-crisis reforms to the European financial market infrastructure, which also 
includes the Regulation (EU) No 909/2014 on securities settlement and on Central Securities Depositories and 
amendments to the Settlement Finality Directive 1998/26/EC and the Financial Collateral Arrangements 
Directive 2002/47/EC.  
16 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) H.R. 4173 (the ‘Dodd-Frank Act’).  
17 See the G20 Leaders’ Statement, n 13 supra; European Commission ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories’ 
(Brussels COM 2010) 484/5, 6, describing the ‘final objective’ of the clearing obligation as ‘reducing risk in the 
financial system’, and the Recitals to EMIR, including Recital 15, explaining that the driver for mandatory 
central clearing is that it ‘reduces systemic risk’.  
18 The objectives of the clearing mandate require a CCP itself to be robust, which explains why this reform has 
been accompanied by extensive reforms to the rules for the authorisation and supervision of CCPs, e.g. in Titles 
III and IV of EMIR. There is a large literature analysing the organisational and economic aspects of the 
robustness of CCPs, including discussing how to safeguard CCPs’ liquidity. These issues fall outside the scope 
of this article, but see for example D Murphy and P Nahai-Williamson, ‘Dear Prudence, won’t you come out to 
play? Approaches to the analysis of CCP default fund adequacy’ [2014] Bank of England Financial Stability 
Paper No. 30 and D Elliott, ‘Central Counterparty Loss Allocation Rules’ [2013] Bank of England Financial 
Stability Paper No. 20.     
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2.1 Default rules  
Parties which face a CCP directly are known as clearing members. To become a member, 
applicants must meet operational and financial criteria, such as minimum net capital19 and 
members must continue to comply with these criteria throughout their membership. Due to 
the demands of being a member, such as providing and moving collateral on CCP deadlines, 
many parties wishing to clear OTC derivatives will do so as clients of clearing members 
rather than becoming members themselves.20 While there is considerable uniformity in the 
clearing agreements between the CCP and its members, this does not carry over to client 
clearing agreements. Partly for this reason, and partly for reasons of space we do not discuss 
client clearing further in this article. 
Once accepted, the member enters into a contract with the CCP. This incorporates the 
clearing house’s rulebook, which details the technical processes involved in the clearing 
relationship. The rulebook contains the CCP’s default rules, which provide the circumstances 
when members can be declared in default, and the procedures which will apply once a default 
notice is served.  
As with all contracts, there is potentially a risk that this agreement may be declared 
void for reasons including one party’s lack of capacity, or disrupted by vitiating factors or by 
claims that the terms have been varied or waived by oral agreement. In particular, the history 
of the bilateral (uncleared) derivatives markets has been punctuated by claims brought by 
non-financial counterparties that certain complex products were ultra vires.21 However, given 
that the membership of clearing houses is, for the moment, dominated by sophisticated 
financial institutions, this risk seems minimal as regards the CCP.22  
The more significant risk is that a member claims that its terms with the CCP have 
been waived or varied during a default, for example by oral statements by a CCP’s staff. This 
issue arose during a close-out of a sugar trader by several of its brokers, with subsequent 
                                                          
19 See for example, LCH.Clearnet’s membership criteria detailed at <http://www.lch.com/members-
clients/members>. This states that ‘LCH.Clearnet members are of a high credit quality and have large financial 
resources.’  
20 As discussed in J Braithwaite, ‘Legal Perspectives on Client Clearing’ [2015] LSE Law, Society and 
Economics Working Paper Series 14.  
21 For example, Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1992] 2 A.C. 1 and Haugesund Kommune v Depfa 
ACS Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 579 involving, respectively, a UK borough council and a Norwegian local 
authority. More recently, note the unsuccessful ultra vires argument in Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon 
Petroleum Corporation [2012] EWCA Civ 1049, [40] and the successful one in Credit Suisse International v 
Stichting Vestia Groep [2014] EWHC 3101 (Comm). 
22 However, non-financial counterparties will make up a significant part of the membership of commodities 
CCPs, and there are also proposals to broaden the membership of repo clearing services to include non-financial 
counterparties, as discussed in K Devasabai, ‘CME and LCH.Clearnet prep buyside repo clearing’ Risk (30 
January 2015).  
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litigation turning on whether a conference call constituted a binding agreement by brokers to 
liquidate the trader’s positions in a co-ordinated way. This allegation was denied by the 
brokers, who had each closed-out as they thought fit. Though the Court of Appeal ultimately 
found that the ingredients for a binding contract were not met and therefore there was no 
agreement to close out in a co-ordinated way,23 the fact that the case proceeded so far 
illustrates the importance of the CCP establishing clear contractual arrangements before they 
are needed, and strictly adhering to them once they are.  
 
2.2 Financial resources  
CCPs hold financial resources to absorb the losses which result from a member’s default.24 
The collection and availability of this collateral, and certainty about a CCP’s proprietary 
rights in these assets are fundamental to the operation of a CCP.25 This is reflected in the 
EMIR definition of clearing as ‘the process of establishing positions, including the 
calculation of net obligations, and ensuring that financial instruments, cash, or both, are 
available to secure the exposures arising from those positions’.26 
There are two ways which clearing members post collateral to CCPs, as margin and as 
default fund contributions. Margin itself has two components. Variation margin reflects the 
current mark-to-market value of a cleared portfolio and thus typically flows through the CCP 
to members which have a positive mark-to-market position with the CCP, from those with a 
negative position. It may be calculated daily or even intra-day. Initial margin is an additional 
amount required by the CCP to cover changes in value of the portfolio between the last 
variation margin payment and close out, to a high degree of confidence.27 Cash is typically 
                                                          
23 ED&F Man Commodity Advisers Limited v Fluxo-Cane Overseas Limited [2009] EWCA Civ 406. This 
litigation is discussed further in section 3.1 infra.  
24 A short overview of a CCP’s financial resources is set out in Rehlon and Nixon, n 11 supra, 4−6. A detailed 
analysis of this aspect of central clearing is set out in Murphy and Nahai-Williamson, n 18 supra and the legal 
issues involved are analysed in L Gullifer, n 10 supra. 
25 As discussed by A Levitin, ‘Response: The tenuous case for derivatives clearinghouses’ (2012−13) 101 
Georgetown Law Journal 445, where he describes CCPs as ‘highly layered capital structures’, at 461. This piece 
is a response to Y Yadav, ‘The Problematic case of clearinghouses in complex markets’ (2012−13) 101 
Georgetown Law Journal 387, questioning the risk mitigation effects of CCPs in the credit default swaps 
market. See also A Armakola and J-P Laurent, ‘CCP resilience and clearing membership’ (20 November 2015) 
unpublished paper, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625579, discussing the 
relationship between different types of financial resources available to a CCP and the exposure of clearing 
members. 
26 EMIR, Article 2(3) (emphasis added). 
27 Clearing members are required to post margin on their own house accounts and on client accounts. CCPs’ 
margin requirements are passed by members on to clients, but often the clearing member can call clients for 
additional margin, for instance if it is troubled by the client’s credit quality.  
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used for variation margin and a portion of initial margin,28 with high quality liquid securities 
(as defined by the CCP) usually used for the remaining fraction of initial margin.29  
In addition to margin, clearing members will also contribute to a ‘pre-funded default 
fund’.30 This fund is often described as ‘mutualised’31 because the contributions of all of the 
members are available should the losses on the default of a particular member exceed its own 
contributions. While the levels of margin and default fund required from members are part of 
each CCP’s design, there are minimum standards laid down in EMIR and in accompanying 
Regulatory Technical Standards.32 The default fund, for instance, must be sufficient to enable 
the CCP to ‘withstand, under extreme but plausible market conditions, the default of the 
clearing member to which it has the largest exposures or of the second and third largest 
clearing members, if the sum of their exposures is larger.’33 CCPs often also make some of 
their own capital available to absorb any losses above a clearing member’s margin and 
default fund contribution (which is called having ‘skin in the game’).  
Overall, there is a ‘default waterfall’ of financial resources which are available to 
absorb the losses of a defaulting member. The CCP must use these resources in the order 
prescribed by EMIR, namely, starting with margin posted by the defaulting member, then the 
default fund contribution of the defaulting member, followed by a measure of the CCP’s own 
resources and then the default fund contributions of the non-defaulting members.34 There 
may then be additional ‘unfunded’ resources available, such as the right for the CCP to call 
for additional default fund contributions or to haircut (or discount) variation margin gains 
before passing them on to members. Where all such resources are exhausted, a CCP risks 
                                                          
28 An exception is contingent variation margin arrangements where instead of variation margin flowing through 
the CCP from losers to those in the money, credits and debits are made to a net margin account at the CCP. 
Crucially if the total (initial plus variation) flow on a given day is positive, i.e. the CCP owes the relevant 
account money, then this remains as a credit, without cash actually being paid.   
For more detail on the use of cash and on the banking arrangements underpinning its transfer to CCPs by 
members, see J Braithwaite and D Murphy, ‘Got to be certain: The legal framework for CCP default 
management processes’ [2016] Bank of England Financial Stability Paper number 37.  
29 For more detail on the use of securities as collateral, and in particular on the implications of the intermediated 
nature of modern securities, see section 3.3 infra.  
30 As regulated by EMIR, Article 42. 
31 For example, in Murphy and Nahai-Williamson n 18 supra, 4.  
32 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 153/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing EMIR with regard to 
regulatory technical standards on requirements for central counterparties 
33 EMIR, Article 42(3), as expanded upon by Chapter VII of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 153/2013 
of 19 December 2012 supplementing EMIR with regard to regulatory technical standards on requirements for 
central counterparties.  
34 The principal requirements as regards the default waterfall are set out in EMIR, Article 45 as expanded upon 
by Chapter IX of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 153/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing 
EMIR with regard to regulatory technical standards on requirements for central counterparties 
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insolvency,35 although CCP resolution regimes are under development.36 In recognition of 
these risks, CCPs are required to have in place recovery plans or ‘living wills’.37  
 
2.3 CCPs and insolvency law 
One, but not the only, reason that clearing members default is that they are insolvent or 
heading that way. As a result, a CCP may have to manage a default concurrently with an 
insolvency regime. This section discusses the extent to which this may constrain a CCP in 
practice. 
In England, there are numerous insolvency regimes which might apply to a failing or 
failed company. One analysis has suggested that a company incorporated as a bank in 
England could be subject to any one of eleven different types of insolvency procedure.38 We 
focus here on formal insolvency proceedings, which are either an administration or a winding 
up. The primary objective of an administration is ‘rescuing the company as a going 
concern’39 and the administrators are, in the ordinary course of events, to act in the interests 
of the company’s creditors as a whole. As an administration is designed to provide breathing 
space for the company, it imposes a moratorium on insolvency proceedings (i.e. the company 
cannot be wound up in this period) and on other legal processes, including on the 
enforcement of security over the company’s property without the permission of the court or 
the administrator. This differs from winding up, or liquidation, which involves gathering in 
the company’s assets for distribution to creditors and shareholders, followed by the 
dissolution of the company.   
                                                          
35 J Allen, ‘Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis’ (2012) 64 
Stanford Law Review 1079 charts the effects of CCP insolvency in terms of systemic risk. 
36 The European Commission’s plans for developing a resolution regimes for non-banks are set out in European 
Commission, ‘Roadmap: Framework for resolution of financial institutions other than banks’ (April 2015) 
available at < http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2015_fisma_029_cwp_ccp_resolution_of_non_bank_resolution_en.pdf> 
37 The Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (15 
October 2014, available at http://www.fsb.org/2014/10/r_141015/) states that jurisdictions should require robust 
Recovery and Resolution Plans (RRPs) (Key attribute 1.2 and I-Annex 4). Focusing on recovery, all UK CCPs 
are required to have a recovery plan, or a ‘living will’. Recovery plans and resolution are both discussed further 
in The Bank of England, ‘The Bank of England’s Supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures – Annual 
Report 2016’ (March 2016), section 3.4. 
38 See D Turing n 10 supra, 161. Turing’s eleven types do not include creditors’ schemes of arrangement 
(Companies Act 2006, s 895) or the special resolution regimes under the Banking Act 2009. 
39 Insolvency Act 1986, s 3(1) of Schedule B1, as added by the Enterprise Act 2002, which created the current 
regime for administrations. Section 3(1) includes other objectives, being (b) achieving a better result for the 
company’s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the company were wound up (without first being in 
administration) and (c) realising property in order to make a distribution to one of more secured or preferential 
creditors.  Sections 3(3)−(4) make it clear that these objectives are in order of priority.  
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If these formal insolvency regimes applied wholly and concurrently during the default 
of a clearing member, CCP default management would be much harder and more uncertain 
than it is. Even though the Australian case of Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd v IATA confirmed 
the robustness of the fundamental structure of a clearing house upon insolvency of a 
member,40 a CCP’s particular contractual and proprietary rights as regards its failing member 
would still be difficult or impossible to apply if insolvency law were to take precedence. This 
is principally because formal insolvency regimes put the insolvency practitioner in charge of 
many aspects of the defaulter’s business in ways which would disrupt the CCP’s own 
management of the default. For instance, mutual set-off would be overseen by the insolvency 
practitioner rather than the CCP.41 Certain of the defaulter’s contracts with the CCP might 
also be disclaimed, set aside or declared void. Transactions entered into by the defaulter in a 
prescribed window before the onset of insolvency may be vulnerable to being set aside, under 
the rules applying to preferences,42 undervalued transactions,43 and floating charges.44 Given 
a CCP’s reliance on collateral, the powers of an administrator over charged property would 
also be problematic. For example, the administrator could potentially apply to court for 
permission to dispose of property that is subject to a charge other than a floating charge. The 
court must be satisfied this would ‘be likely to promote the purpose of administration in 
respect of the company’. The administrator may also dispose of property that is subject to a 
floating charge without the need to go to court.45    
These risks are mitigated, however, by statutory ‘safe harbours’ which provide special 
treatment under insolvency law for certain classes of financial transactions, and for certain 
market participants. They typically prevent the disruption of private arrangements for close 
out, netting and the provision of collateral. As Paech has documented, they have been 
implemented worldwide on the basis of their effects on systemic risk, and because they 
                                                          
40 Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd v IATA. [2008] HCA 3 (HC). See also British Eagle v Compagnie Nationale 
Air France n 3 supra. The much discussed majority House of Lords decision in British Eagle held that an 
arrangement between airlines for multi-lateral netting without novation to a central counterparty was invalid on 
the insolvency of one of the participants, as the law required the set off of mutual debts. This risk has been 
addressed in clearing house structures where contracts are entered into with the CCP, and the robustness of this 
arrangement on insolvency has been confirmed by the later case of Ansett. See further, M Bridge, ‘Clearing 
Houses and Insolvency’ (2008) 2 Law and Financial Markets Review 418. 
41 Insolvency Rules 1986, Rule 4.90  
42 Insolvency Act 1986, s 239. 
43 Insolvency Act 1986, s 238. 
44 Insolvency Act 1986, s 245. 




increase market liquidity.46 Such is their importance to the market that safe harbour regimes 
have become ‘fairly homogenous from a global perspective’,47 so, for example, the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) noted that, as at early 2010, 37 
countries had enacted legislation allowing the enforceability of close-out netting.48 This 
homogeneity successfully supports the ‘cross-jurisdictional use of assets on the present 
[global] scale’.49 Some commentators, nonetheless, regard these safe harbours as 
controversial because they question the benefits50 or because of concerns about the influence 
of powerful, non-state actors on public rule-making.51  
CCPs benefit from one of the most extensive sets of legislative safe harbour 
provisions found anywhere in the financial system. While much of this regime pre-dates the 
2008 financial crisis, the introduction of the clearing mandate following the G20’s 2009 
statements have provided further, powerful justifications based on the fact that CCPs have 
been co-opted to safeguard the stability of the post-crisis financial markets. Indeed, it is a pre-
requisite of this part of the regulatory response to the financial crisis that CCPs are able to 
apply their default rules in a predictable way, as it would be self-defeating if the public sector 
were to allow insolvency laws to weaken one of the principal financial stability measures.  
Under English law, CCP safe harbours have several different legislative sources. The 
overall effect is supportive of CCPs operations generally, and of default management 
specifically. Nonetheless, a detailed audit of these rules, set out in section 3.1.2 infra, 
                                                          
46 For a further discussion of the rationale for the ‘privileged treatment arising under insolvency safe harbours’, 
see P Paech, ‘The Value of Financial Market Insolvency Safe Harbours’ (2016) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
1. He argues that of the two classic rationales for safe harbours−increasing liquidity and decreasing overall 
systemic risk−the former is the more significant and harder to challenge. 
47 ibid 5.  
48 ISDA, The Importance of Close-out Netting (2010) ISDA Research Notes No. 1, 2.  
49 Paech, n 46 supra, 30, a transnational effect also vividly documented in A Riles, Collateral Knowledge 
(University of Chicago Press 2011).  
50 The most comprehensive attack on financial contract ‘immunities’ including safe harbours for close-out 
netting is in R Mokal, ‘Liquidity, Systemic Risk, and the Bankruptcy Treatment of Financial Contracts’ (2015-
2016) 10 Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law 15. Mokal argues that safe harbours 
are counterproductive, based on a purportedly flawed and false understanding of systemic risk, and that they 
cannot be explained on any basis other than the path dependency of policy-makers. See also R Bliss and G 
Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout’ (10 May 2005) Federal Reserve 
Bank of Chicago WP2005−03, which questions whether close-out netting reduces systemic risk. In a variation 
on this line of criticism, Levitin argues that the mutualisation of risk is preferable to safe harbours from a 
systemic risk perspective, and submits that insolvency safe harbours should therefore be repealed in favour of 
mandatory clearing for systemically important financial contracts. A. Levitin, ‘Prioritization and Mutualization: 
Clearinghouses and the Redundancy of the Bankruptcy Safeharbours’ (2015-2016) 10 Brooklyn Journal of 
Corporate, Financial and Commercial Law 129. Contrast, however, the related debate about whether the ability 
of CCPs to reduce systemic risk has been overstated. See, for example, C Pirrong, ‘The Clearinghouse Cure’ 
[Winter 2008−9] Regulation 4 (focusing on mandatory clearing for credit default swaps) and M Roe, 
‘Clearinghouse Overconfidence’ (2013) 101 California Law Review 1641.  
51 For e.g., Mokal ibid, 73-87 and C Bradley, ‘Private International Law-making for the Financial Markets’ 
(2005−6) 29 Fordham International Law Journal 127.  
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demonstrates that the fragmentary and sometimes inconsistent protections can be 
problematic. 
The most comprehensive set of safe harbour rules for CCPs is found in Part VII of the 
Companies Act 1989 (‘Part VII’). This important statute sets out extensive safeguards for 
CCPs, expressly protecting market contracts,52 market charges53 and market property54 from 
specific provisions of insolvency law, and also providing, at section 159, a general 
disapplication of insolvency law where it conflicts with market contracts and the default 
rules55 of recognised clearing houses (amongst other exemptions56). Part VII is the most 
prominent source of legislative protections and other legislative support for CCPs’ 
operations, including its default rules.57 However, it is not the ‘cure all’ it is sometimes taken 
for; it is by no means designed to exempt all activities of a CCP from all conflicting law. 
Rather, Part VII should be seen as being reinforced by various other legislative provisions.  
There are two main sets of legislation which supplement Part VII to protect a CCP’s 
default management processes. The first is the Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement 
Finality) Regulations 1999/2979 (‘SFR’), which implement the Settlement Finality Directive 
1998/26/EC. The Directive aims to provide a consistent Europe-wide treatment of the process 
of settling a financial transaction, including where one of the system’s participants becomes 
insolvent. The SFR apply to designated ‘systems’, and it is now a requirement of Article 
17(4) of EMIR that any authorised CCP has to be designed a ‘system’ for this purpose. 
Regulation 14 of the SFR sets out the principle that the proceedings (broadly defined, and 
including ‘default arrangements’) of a designated system will take precedence if inconsistent 
with insolvency law; later regulations disapply specific provisions of the Insolvency Act. 
Importantly, there is specific modification of the law of insolvency with respect to a 
‘collateral security charge and the actions taken to enforce such a charge’.58  
                                                          
52 Broadly defined in Part VII, s 155 and including contracts between a recognised clearing house and its 
members.  
53 Defined in Part VII, s 173 as a ‘charge, whether fixed or floating, granted … in favour of a recognised 
clearing house, for the purpose of securing debts or liabilities arising in connection with their ensuring the 
performance of market contracts …’ 
54 Addressed in Part VII, s 177, which covers margin in relation to a market contract or default fund 
contribution. 
55 ‘Default rules’ is defined by Part VII, s 188 of and this definition is discussed further in section 3.1.2 infra.  
56 These other exemptions relate to the settlement of market contracts not dealt with under default rules, and 
porting of client positions and assets on the default of a member.  
57 Part VII principally facilitates a recognised clearing house’s default proceedings by modifying insolvency 
law. However, Part VII also assists default proceedings in other ways, e.g. section 160 imposes a duty to assist 
with a recognised clearing house’s default proceedings on any person who has or had control of the defaulter’s 
assets, or who has or had documents relating to a defaulter.  
58 SFR, Regulation 18.  
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The second piece of legislation which supplements and extends Part VII’s support for 
CCPs’ operations, as already noted, is the Financial Collateral Arrangements (No.2) 
Regulations 2003/3226 (‘FCAR’) which implement the Financial Collateral Arrangements 
Directive 2002/47/EC. This Directive seeks to harmonise rules for the creation, perfection 
and enforcement of financial collateral across the EU, and increase legal certainty about such 
arrangements. The FCAR apply to both security interest and title transfer collateral 
arrangements over ‘financial collateral’. This is defined as ‘cash, financial instruments or 
credit claims’,59 so it covers nearly all of a CCP’s collateral, whether posted as margin or 
default fund contributions. The FCAR contain a number of helpful disapplications for CCPs. 
Notably, Regulations 4, 5, 6 and 7 disapply certain formalities, such as the registration of 
charges, while Regulations 8 to 11 disapply certain insolvency rules. This disapplication of 
insolvency law is broader than that found in Part VII or the SFR. In particular the FCAR are 
the only of the three legislative regimes to disapply section 176A of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
Furthermore, this is the only framework of the three which expressly applies on the 
insolvency of the collateral provider or taker (as expressly set out in Regulation 10(1)). Given 
the pivotal role played by financial collateral in their safe operation, CCPs must take care to 
ensure that their arrangements enjoy these important protections. Particular areas of risk are 
considered in section 3.3 infra.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
If market participants did not default, there would be no need for CCPs. CCPs deploy 
detailed contractual procedures, backed up with financial resources, in order to manage 
defaults safely and prevent contagion to the rest of the market. The importance of this 
function of CCPs has been heightened by regulatory reform the wake of the last financial 
crisis, justifying CCPs’ special legislative treatment. Part VII and the SFR, coupled with the 
more general provisions of the FCAR, combine to create a supportive, if piecemeal, regime 
for CCPs’ default management processes. Against this background, the following section 
evaluates the extent to which material risks remain, whether from shortcomings in safe 
harbour legislation, or from other types of legal challenge.  
 
                                                          
59 Each term is separately defined in FCAR, Regulation 3. 
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3. LEGAL ISSUES ALONG A DEFAULT TIMELINE 
 
3.1 Declaration of default 
The declaration of clearing member default lays the foundation for the procedures which 
follow, and certainty is therefore paramount. An incorrect or inaccurate declaration may 
compromise the CCP’s own actions and, because it could trigger cross-default provisions60 in 
other contracts, or discourage other parties from dealing with the member, or possibly tip a 
member into insolvency, it might also expose the CCP to a sizeable claim for damages.   
There are three principal challenges for the CCP at this stage which, respectively, 
involve contractual interpretation, careful navigation of the relevant legislative provisions, 
and awareness that the right to call an Event of Default may be stayed if a member is affected 
by a special resolution regime. The following explores these issues in more detail.  
 
3.1.1 Contractual compliance 
Typically, the Events of Default defined in a CCP’s membership agreement will include non-
payment of any sums due from the member, a breach of the agreement, the initiation of 
insolvency procedures variously defined, and regulatory action being taken against the 
member.61 Such lists are often supplemented by ‘catch-all’ terms. For example, the CCP may 
be allowed to call a default if it is ‘necessary or desirable for our own protection’62 or in the 
event of the member ‘appearing to the Clearing House to be unable, or to be likely to become 
unable, to meet its obligations in respect of one or more Contracts’.63 It is also common for 
Events of Default to include grace periods, notice periods and other formalities which must 
be observed before a default can be declared.  
The declaration of default may appear to be a simple step, however, the litigation 
around the close out of Fluxo-Cane Overseas Limited’s positions in exchange traded sugar 
derivatives demonstrates that there can be pitfalls. In one of several English cases concerning 
                                                          
60 A cross-default clause in contract X means that if a borrower defaults on other financial indebtedness it will 
also be a default under X. In practice, these clauses are heavily negotiated and vary as to materiality thresholds, 
de minimis amounts, grace periods and so on.  
61 See for example section 5, LCH.Clearnet Default Rules, March 2016 version, available at  
<http://www.lch.com/documents/731485/2008793/Default-Rules-07.04.16.pdf/58281f8b-c3bf-4ee2-9faa-
79b90e74c12a> 
62 Sucden v Fluxo-Cane Overseas Limited [2010] EWHC 2133 (Comm) at [44(4)].  
63 Section 3, LCH.Clearnet Default Rules, March 2016 version, n 61 supra. 
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these events64 Fluxo-Cane argued that one of its brokers had prematurely begun the 
liquidation of its positions at a time when it had no right to do so. After a lengthy review of 
the Terms of Business between the parties the judge ultimately found that the broker was not 
entitled to rely on the most obvious Event of Default in this case (the non-payment of margin) 
because the contract required the failure to pay to continue for ‘one Business Day’ from 
Fluxo-Cane being given ‘notice of non-performance’. As this period had not elapsed before 
the broker took action to liquidate the positions, there was not a valid Event of Default on this 
ground at the relevant time.65 Though the broker stated in court that ‘the only default that he 
had in mind at the time of sending out the default letter was non-payment of margin’, it also 
contended that there were in fact other valid Events of Default at the relevant time. However, 
a number of attempts to point to a valid Event of Default also proved unsuccessful. For 
instance, an Event of Default for non-payment of indebtedness when due was also held not to 
be triggered at the time that the liquidation started, with the judge finding that it would be 
wrong to allow this clause to bypass the notice provisions in the non-payment of margin 
Event of Default.66 Similarly, the judge held that the broker could not rely on a cross-default 
clause, which it had submitted was triggered by findings in a parallel case between Fluxo-
Cane and another broker. This, the judge held, would lead to too much ‘commercial 
uncertainty’.67  
The broker was saved, however, by the judge’s finding that other Event of Defaults 
had been triggered before liquidation commenced. The first valid Event of Default was the 
term covering the situation where Fluxo-Cane ‘disaffirms, disclaims or repudiates any 
obligations under the agreement’. The judge held this happened at a meeting between Fluxo-
Cane and its brokers before the liquidation commenced.68 The second was a broad term 
which allowed the broker to close out if ‘necessary or desirable for our own protection’.69  
However, before being able to rely on either Event of Default, the broker had to persuade the 
judge that it did not matter that they were not expressly relied upon at the time of the 
liquidation. This argument succeeded, but with the judge noting the ‘exceptional’ 
circumstances of this close out.70 
                                                          
64 Sucden, n 62 supra. English litigation also included ED & F Man v Fluxo-Cane Overseas Limited [2010] 
EWHC 212 (Comm) and Marex Financial Limited v Fluxo-Cane Overseas Limited [2010] EWHC 2690 
(Comm). There was also concurrent litigation in New York.  
65 Sucden, n 62 supra, at [35] and [36].  
66 ibid at [44(2)]. 
67 ibid at [44(8)]. 
68 ibid at [44(3)]. 
69 ibid at [44(4)]. 
70 ibid at [44(7)]. 
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This narrow victory demonstrates that, even where standardised contract terms may 
be in use, it can be very difficult to observe notice and grace periods as a default actually 
unfolds. It also shows that cross-default clauses may not help as anticipated. In this light, a 
CCP would be well-advised to minimise or standardise drafting providing for notice periods 
and, secondly, to ensure that its ‘fire drills’ practise these aspects of declaring defaults. The 
primary purpose of Events of Default is to allow the CCP to act with speed and certainty, and 
this objective will be wholly undermined if the foundational step is called into dispute.  
 
3.1.2 Statutory safe harbours: Defaults, coverage and inconsistencies 
It is not enough that the CCP has valid contractual grounds to call an Event of Default.  
Given the likelihood that a defaulting member will be insolvent, or near-insolvent, it is also 
important that the CCPs’ actions fall within the available statutory protections from 
insolvency law. To an extent, this turns on the grounds on which the default has been called 
in the first place. The issues here are delicate not least because, perhaps surprisingly, there is 
no consistent definition of the term ‘default’ in the relevant legislation. If a particular CCP 
procedure does not qualify as a ‘default rule’ (or equivalent) then is it important that it 
qualifies as another type of protected procedure.  
 
The discussion below shows that each of the four main legislative provisions relevant to 
CCPs uses different definitions and, to an extent, different approaches, when framing their 
respective rules around ‘defaults’. 
 
  (1) Part VII 
Section 188 of Part VII defines ‘default rules’ as the rules  
 
of a recognised clearing house which provide for the taking of action in the 
event of a person (including another recognised .. clearing house) appearing 
unable, or likely to become unable, to meet his obligations in respect of one or 
more market contracts connected with the … clearing house.  
 
The term is also defined to include the default procedures referred to under Article 48 
of EMIR (see below) and actions the CCP takes under default procedures in Article 
4(4) of the Regulatory Technical Standards in respect of client clearing.71 As noted 
                                                          
71 Article 4(4) of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing 
EMIR with regard to regulatory technical standards on indirect clearing arrangements, the clearing obligation, 
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above, however, Part VII does not only cover default rules. For example, the general 
modification of insolvency rules also extends to ‘the rules of a … recognised clearing 
house as to the settlement of market contracts not dealt with under its default rules’, 
and rules of a recognised clearing house relating to the transfer of client contracts (i.e. 
if a member fails). 
The Part VII definitions are expressly adopted elsewhere. For example, 
Section 7 of the Banking Act (Restriction of Partial Property Transfers) Order 200972 
adopts various definitions from Part VII, including ‘default rules’. This disapplies 
those parts of the Banking Act 2009 which give the Resolution Authorities powers to 
make partial property transfers from a failing bank or other type of financial 
institution in resolution, avoiding conflict with CCPs’ default rules.  
 
(2) SFR 
The SFR use the term ‘default arrangements’, which are defined by Regulation 2(1) as 
arrangements  
to limit systemic and other types of risk which arise in the event of a participant … 
appearing to be unable, or likely to become unable, to meet its obligations in respect 
of a transfer order, including, for example, any default rules within the meaning of 
Part VII … or any other arrangements for − (a) netting, (b) the close out of open 
positions, (c) the application or transfer of collateral security; or (d) the transfer or 
assets or positions on the default of a participant in the system. 
 
This definition therefore includes, but is broader than, ‘default rules’ under Part VII. 
As a result, a procedure may qualify as a ‘default arrangement’ but not as a ‘default 
rule’ under Part VII. 
As with Part VII, the SFR protect more than just default arrangements. The 
pivotal regulation in this respect is Regulation 14 (which sets out the principle that the 
‘proceedings’ of a designated system will take precedence if inconsistent with 
insolvency law). Regulation 14(1) expressly lists the contracts covered by this 
provision, including ‘a transfer order’, ‘the default arrangements of the designated 
system’, ‘the rules of a designated system as to the settlement of transfer orders not 
dealt with under its default arrangements’ and ‘a contract for the purpose or realising 
collateral security in connection with participation in a designated system or in a 
system which is an interoperable system in relation to that designated system 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the public register, access to a trading venue, non-financial counterparties, and risk mitigation techniques for 
OTC derivatives contracts no cleared by a CCP.  
72 S.I. 2009/322. 
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otherwise than pursuant to its default arrangements.’ This broad drafting could 
therefore apply proceedings falling outside of the definition of default arrangements.  
 
(3) FCAR 
The FCAR do not expressly mention default rules or default procedures, but they are 
vital to both. As mentioned, they protect ‘financial collateral arrangements’, defined 
in Regulation 3(1) as either a security financial collateral arrangement or title transfer 
financial collateral arrangement over ‘financial collateral’ (defined as cash, financial 
instruments or credit claims). The risks around qualifying under these definitions are 
discussed in section 3.3 infra.  
 
(4) EMIR  
Perhaps surprisingly, given their importance to CCPs, EMIR also does not define 
either ‘default’ or ‘default rules’. Article 48(1) suggests that ‘default procedures’ are 
‘procedures to be followed if a clearing member does not comply with the 
participation requirements of the CCP ‘laid down in Article 37’. This is a relatively 
narrow definition, as Article 37 refers to ‘non-discriminatory, transparent and 
objective’ admissions criteria, which will not cover all of the Events of Default that 
some CCPs might wish to have, such as those anticipating potential future events 
which have not yet crystallised.  
In any event, there are no general safe harbours for default procedures in 
EMIR. A narrow protection is set out in Recital 64, which indicates that if a member 
defaults, the EMIR requirements on segregation and porting, designed to protect the 
clients of the defaulting member ‘should therefore prevail over any conflicting laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States that prevent the 
parties from fulfilling them’.73 Thus, there is coverage for client segregation and 
porting but not for CCP default procedures generally.  
 
In sum, the main legislative protections relevant to CCPs differ in terms of what is protected, 
what is disapplied, and how protections are achieved. Most strikingly, the three sets of 
legislation which expressly refer to a CCPs’ contractual and proprietary rights on a default 
offer varying degrees of coverage, with the SFR definition being the broadest, and EMIR the 
                                                          
73 Implemented into law in the UK by amendments to Part VII.  
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narrowest. In such a sensitive area of law, such inconsistency is undesirable as it may lead to 
delay and uncertainty.  
There are also more specific concerns about these definitions. Most importantly, in 
both Part VII and the SFR, the definitions of ‘default rules’ and ‘default arrangements’ 
(respectively) require that the defaulter is unable or likely to become unable to meet its 
obligations to the CCP. Both definitions therefore cover narrower sets of rules than the 
default rules as they will be defined by some CCPs’ membership agreements. This gap may 
be significant in practice. For example, as the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers 
demonstrated, a group’s ultimate parent can fail at a time when some other members of the 
group, including subsidiaries which are clearing members of CCPs, show no signs of being in 
breach of their obligations. At this point, a CCP may have the contractual right to call an 
Event of Default. If it did so, the ensuing default processes would appear to fall outside the 
definitions of default rules and default arrangements. To benefit from the important safe 
harbours in both sets of legislation, the CCP would have to show that the rules it was relying 
upon fell into another protected class, for example because they related to ‘the settlement of 
market contracts not dealt with under its default rules’. At the very least, the narrowness of 
the statutory drafting, compared to the breadth of a CCP’s terms, means that different default 
processes will be treated differently under the same legislation. This requires parties to keep 
close track of complex legislation during this first stage of a default.  
 
3.1.3 Special resolution regimes and Events of Default 
For reasons mentioned above, members of CCPs are predominantly banks and investment 
firms.74 Most CCP members therefore fall under one of the various, recently implemented 
special resolution regimes. These regimes have, to an extent, been designed to give CCP’s 
default rules precedence,75 but in some circumstances, they will restrict a CCP’s right to 
declare an Event of Default.  
For UK firms, the Bank of England (as Resolution Authority) has very broad powers 
under the Banking Act 2009 and the Investment Bank Special Administration Regulations 
                                                          
74 CCPs publish membership lists, for example, LCH.Clearnet’s lists are published on its website at  
<http://www.lch.com/members-clients/members/current-membership > 
The Bank of England has published work showing the important interlinkages between banks and CCPs, see 
The Bank of England, ‘The Bank of England’s Supervision of Financial Market Infrastructures – Annual Report 
2016’ (March 2016), section 1.2 available at  
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/fmis/default.aspx> 
75 As discussed infra, and noted in the discussion of ‘default rules’ under Part VII in section 3.1.2 supra.  
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201176 which it can use to manage ailing financial institutions.  These include stabilisation 
tools, such as the power to bail-in liabilities, or to transfer of some or all assets and liabilities 
to an asset management vehicle, bridge bank, or other purchaser. As a last resort, HM 
Treasury may transfer the institution to temporary public sector ownership. These powers 
enable the Authorities to leave ‘bad’ assets and liabilities behind, separating them from the 
‘good’ ones being transferred. This could disrupt contracts between the failing bank and its 
counterparties, including contracts expressly designed to protect the counterparty in such 
circumstances (e.g. through netting), although no creditor worse off safeguards are intended 
to limit the extent of the potential disruption and to provide appropriate compensation in 
some circumstances.77 
These resolution powers have been disapplied in some of the cases where they may 
clash with the rights of a CCP. The limits on the resolution powers in this context include, 
first, that, The Bank of England may not make a partial property transfer order with respect to 
the failing entity if this would modify or make unenforceable the default rules of a recognised 
clearing house, or rules for the settlement of market contracts by a recognised clearing 
house.78 Secondly, temporary stays under section 70A of the Banking Act 2009 may not be 
used by the Bank of England to stay the rights of CCPs, because CCPs constitute ‘excluded 
parties’ for this section. 
The special treatment for CCPs is not absolute, however. Importantly, CCPs are not 
excluded from the effects of section 48Z of the Banking Act 2009 which expressly limits 
when a non-defaulting counterparty (i.e., the CCP) may call an Event of Default. This section 
means that where a clearing member falls under the special resolution regime, the CCP 
cannot call an Event of Default just because the member is in resolution, or because the 
authorities have taken another form of ‘crisis management measure’ or ‘crisis prevention 
measure’, or because a recognised third-country resolution action has been taken with respect 
to the member, or because of any event ‘directly linked’ to such a measure. This restriction 
only applies, however, where the member’s ‘substantive obligations continue to be 
performed’.79 The meaning of ‘substantive obligations’ is therefore pivotal in this context, but 
                                                          
76 S.I. 2011/245 
77 For an overview and critical analysis of the new special resolution regimes see J Armour, ‘Making Bank 
Resolution Credible’ in N Moloney, E Ferran and J Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation 
(OUP 2015).  
78 The Banking Act (Restriction of Partial Property Transfers) Order 2009. See supra text to n 71, explaining 
that the definition of default rules for this purpose follows Part VII.  
79 Banking Act 2009, s 48Z(5). 
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the term is not fully defined. Instead, it is characterised as ‘including payment and delivery 
obligations and provision of collateral’ (emphasis added).80  
This limitation on CCPs’ contractual rights tracks wording in the Banking Recovery 
and Resolution Directive,81 and is necessary in order to protect the workings of the new 
resolution regime. It is problematic, however, that these rules do not provide clear guidance 
in several respects. First, it is unclear what, if any, further contractual obligations might count 
as ‘substantive’. The word ‘including’ clearly suggests that the list in the statute of payment, 
delivery and provision of collateral is not definitive, but it is not obvious which of the other 
obligations in the contract (e.g., to abide by other membership criteria) might qualify. 
Further, the two illustrations given in the statute suggest that certain obligations are 
objectively ‘substantive’, so that parties would not be able to define ‘substantive obligations’ 
for themselves. However the opposite may be suggested by other wording in regulation 
3(1A)(b) of the FCAR, and similar wording in section 48Z, which refers to ‘substantive 
obligations provided for in that agreement’ (authors’ emphasis).82 This might lead to an 
inquiry into the parties’ intentions in each case.83 At the very least, a CCP should ensure that 
the failure to meet each of the substantive obligations listed in this statute are included as 
Events of Default, so that as soon as the defaulting party failed to meet them, the CCP would 
have the right to declare a default at the same time as the stay under section 48Z expired. This 
would be cleaner than having to argue that a right to declare the original Event of Default was 
stayed at the time, but was now no longer suspended.  
Section 48Z and the equivalent drafting in the FCAR are part of the special resolution 
regime and not captured by the modifications of ‘insolvency law’ for CCPs in the safe 
harbours discussed above. The result is that a CCP’s default procedures would, under certain 
conditions, have to give way to the special resolution regime. This is a significant 
development for CCPs and an important qualification to their otherwise extensive protections 
from conflicting law. Having a member in special resolution will therefore present an 
unfamiliar set of circumstances for a CCP. The CCP may have to take advice on the 
                                                          
80 This section is mirrored, though not word for word, in 2010 amendments to the FCAR in a new definition of 
‘enforcement event’ at Regulation 3(1A), inserted by the Bank Recovery and Resolution (No. 2) Order 
2014/3348, sch.3(3) para.9(2)(b).  
81 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework 
for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, tracking the wording in Article 68.  
82 This is the FCAR wording. Section 48Z(5) refers to ‘substantive obligations provided for in the contract or 
agreement …’ 
83 Cases from other sectors suggest that such inquiries can be controversial and generate much market interest In 
recent shipping cases, it has been held that a term providing for punctual payment of the charter was an 
innominate term, rather than a condition. See Spar Shipping AS v Grand China Logistics Holdings (Group) Co 
Ltd [2015] EWHC 718 (Comm).  
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definition of ‘substantive obligations’ as events unfold, and then act promptly if and when 
such obligations cease to be met.  
 
3.2 Close out  
Once a default is declared, Article 48 of EMIR states that a CCP must  
 
take prompt action to contain losses and liquidity pressures resulting from defaults and shall 
ensure that the closing out of any clearing member’s positions does not disrupt its operations 
or expose the non-defaulting clearing members to losses that they cannot anticipate or control.   
 
In other words, the CCP has to close out the defaulter’s cleared portfolio, while managing its 
own risks and liquidity and containing the effects of the default.  
‘Close out’ is a standard feature of both cleared and uncleared derivatives contracts. 
As Gloster LJ explained in Videocon Global Ltd v Goldman Sachs International  
 
[t]he purpose of these [close out] provisions is to provide a contractual mechanism for (a) 
calculating the amount due upon the (early) termination of multiple transactions – as a single 
payment due from one party to another; and (b) facilitating the prompt payment of such 
amount.84  
 
The attraction of close out provisions is that the parties agree in advance how the contract 
may be valued and terminated once a default happens, thereby avoiding the need to wait for a 
breach and then sue for damages or other remedies.  
There are very detailed contractual provisions to this effect in the 1992 and 2002 
ISDA Master Agreements, the terms and interpretation of which helpfully informs the 
position for CCPs.85 The 1992 version allows the parties to choose from two methods of 
valuation, namely ‘Market Quotation’, where the valuation is based on quotations from 
Reference Market Makers, or ‘Loss’, where the non-defaulting party reasonably determines 
its losses or gains in good faith. The 2002 Master Agreement replaces these two definitions 
with a single, more flexible, method of valuation called the ‘Close-out Amount’. While there 
is little case law on the latter, as Briggs J put it, a ‘significant body of recent case law has 
developed in relation to the interpretation and application both of Loss and Market Quotation 
                                                          
84 Videocon Global Ltd v Goldman Sachs International [2016] EWCA Civ 130, at [4]. 
85 The ‘scheme’ of the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement is described in detail in Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson [2012] 
EWCA Civ 416, at [12] while the revised close out provisions in the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement are 
described and compared to the 1992 version in The Joint Administrators or Lehman Brothers International 
(Europe) v Lehman Brothers Finance SA [2013] EWCA Civ 188  (hereafter ‘LBIE v LBF’), at [12]−[25].  
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under the 1992 Master Agreement.’86 Close out by CCPs has not yet been subject to scrutiny 
in the English courts,87 and so the extensive case law on the ISDA terms provides important 
insights into the types of challenges that a CCP may face from a defaulting member.   
 
3.2.1 Interpreting contractual close out provisions  
Case law on the ISDA Master Agreement shows that the close out process may prove to be 
contestable, even where very detailed schemes are provided in the contract. This is especially 
likely where a default unfolds in dysfunctional market conditions.  
Challenges of this kind will often come down to interpreting the parties’ contractual 
language. In the English courts, the process of contractual interpretation takes its starting 
point the exact words of the parties’ agreement. Words (such as ‘conditions precedent’, 
‘material terms’ and ‘option rights’88) are given their natural meaning, unless this is clearly 
not the intention of the parties. Where words have more than one potential meaning, the 
court’s task is to ‘ascertain what a reasonable person, that is a person who has all the 
background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the 
situation in which they were at the time of the contract, would have understood the parties to 
have meant.’89 ‘Background knowledge’ in this context is widely drawn, and has been held to 
include ISDA’s User’s Guide, which was discussed in detail by the Court of Appeal in LBIE 
v LBF.90 The commercial context of the parties’ transaction is also factored in, thanks to the 
principle that where there is more than one possible meaning, the court should prefer that 
which ‘is more consistent with business common sense’.91 As a result, the commercial 
purpose of the contract as a whole is more significant than a ‘[d]etailed semantic analysis’ of 
particular words.92 For instance, in a dispute about whether the effects of automatic early 
termination should be left out of the calculation of the Close-out Amount under the 2002 
ISDA Master Agreement, the fact that this valuation lead to an ‘uncommercial result is a 
factor that militates against it being the right interpretation.’93  
                                                          
86 Anthracite Rated Investment (Jersey) Ltd v Lehman Brothers Finance SA (in liquidation) [2011] EWHC 1822 
(Ch) at [116]. In the same part of the judgment Briggs J (as he then was) reviews various ‘propositions’ about 
the 1992 terms on Loss and Market Quotation which have emerged from this body of case law.  
87 Though see discussion in section 3.2.3 infra of the interim application in Re MF Global (in special 
administration) [2015] EWHC 2319 (Ch) where the background facts referred to close out by a CCP.  
88 As interpreted in LBIE v LBF, n 85 supra, at [71]−[95]. 
89 Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900, per Lord Clarke at [21].  
90 LBIE v LBF n 85 supra at [20]−[21] and [107]. 
91 Rainy Sky SA n 89 supra, applied, inter alia, in LBIE v LBF, n 85 supra at [65].  
92 In re Sigma Finance Corporation [2010] 1 All ER 571, at [37] per Lord Collins.  
93 LBIE v LBF n 85 supra, at [68]. 
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While many different details of the ISDA Master Agreement’s close out scheme have 
been considered by the English courts,94 one controversy is particularly relevant for CCPs. 
This is the debate about which factors the non-defaulting party must, and must not, take into 
account during the close out when it calculates the value of its contract with the defaulter.  
In relation to the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement, the English courts have established 
the principle that the non-defaulting party should value the transaction on a ‘clean’ basis, 
meaning that it should assume, for valuation purposes, that the transaction would carry on to 
maturity and that each ‘condition precedent’ would be met. To some criticism, ‘condition 
precedent’ in this context has been interpreted widely. In effect, this means that a range of 
problems on the defaulter’s part have been ruled to be irrelevant to the valuation process.95 In 
ANZ v Société Générale,96 a non-defaulting party calculating Loss could not take into account 
the fact that, had the agreement not been terminated, the defaulter’s condition would have 
allowed the non-defaulting party to make future payments using an alternative method, which 
was more favourable from its perspective. In Britannia Bulk v Bulk Trading,97 the Court of 
Appeal held that the non-defaulting party calculating Loss could not take into account the fact 
that, had the contract continued, its counterparty would have been insolvent and therefore its 
right to be paid suspended under section 2(a)(iii) of the ISDA Master Agreement. However, 
based on amendments included in the 2002 ISDA terms, the Court of Appeal held that the 
value clean principle does not apply in the same way to this later version of the agreement. In 
a case arising out the collapse of Lehman Brothers group, this meant that the effects of a side 
letter to the derivatives deal could be taken into account for the purposes of valuation.98 This 
case also demonstrates the vast sums which may be at stake in disputes about close out. In 
LBIE v LBF, had the side letter not been factored into valuation, the close out sum payable by 
LBIE would have increased by approximately $1 billion. 
It can be seen that even where the valuation stage of close out is covered by very full, 
technical drafting it does not preclude uncertainty and challenges in practice. From the 
                                                          
94 For example, the central issue raised by Videocon Industries Ltd v Goldman Sachs International [2016] 
EWCA Civ 130 was whether Goldman Sachs had, according to the terms of the 1992 Master Agreement, validly 
served notice of the sum to be paid on early termination. Dismissing the appeal, and after a long analysis of the 
relevant contractual provisions, the court found that it had.  
95 See, for example, Norton Rose Fulbright LLP, ‘Derivatives close-outs – Recent case law’ (April 2014), 
describing various recent decisions upholding the value clean principle as ‘controversial’ and stating that it has 
‘[u]nfortunately’ upheld by decisions including Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson [2012] EWCA 419, where the issue 
was the subject of the fourth appeal considered in this judgment. Available at  
<http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/114271/derivatives-close-outs-recent-case-law> 
96 [2000] 1 All ER (Comm) 682. 
97 The fourth appeal in Lomas v JFB Firth Rixson n 95 supra. 
98 LBIE v LBF n 85 supra.  
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perspective of CCPs, these ISDA Master Agreement disputes have a dual significance. On 
the one hand, they serve as a warning about the potential for challenges; on the other hand, 
this case law and the principles developed by the English courts should help CCPs design 
their own documentation and default processes in order to minimise such risks.  
 
3.2.2 Reasonableness 
A non-defaulting party closing out a derivatives contract may also face a challenge that it has 
not acted in a way that is reasonable. A challenge may be based on express contractual 
wording, i.e., where the agreement expressly requires actions to be ‘reasonable’, or on the 
common law duty to exercise discretion in a reasonable, or rational, way.  
The term ‘commercial reasonableness’ is used in both versions of the ISDA Master 
Agreement. The 1992 version requires that parties using the Market Quotation measure of 
close out amount switch to the alternative measure, Loss, if the former is unobtainable or 
‘would not (in the reasonable belief of the party making the determination) produce a 
commercially reasonable result.’99 The 2002 version uses commercial reasonableness in two 
ways: the party closing out must use commercially reasonable procedures and these must 
produce a commercially reasonable result.  
Peregrine Fixed Income Ltd v Robinson Department Store Public Co Ltd100 
considered ‘commercial reasonableness’ under the 1992 Master Agreement. Robinson, the 
non-defaulting party, calculated the amount payable on close out using the Market Quotation 
method. It determined $9.7 million was due to Peregrine, which had entered into liquidation. 
The nominal value of the loss to Peregrine was $87.3 million.101 Peregrine objected that the 
Market Quotation method lead to a result that was ‘commercially unreasonable’. The judge 
agreed that, even though Robinson honestly believed its valuation to be reasonable, it did ‘not 
produce a commercially reasonable result.’102 The judge found that Robinson could not 
properly have reached the conclusion that its valuation was reasonable, taking all the relevant 
factors (such as the divergence with the Loss measure) into account. This approach was based 
on Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp.103 The well-known 
‘Wednesbury test’ requires that parties act honestly, in good faith and not arbitrarily, 
                                                          
99 ISDA Master Agreement (the 1992 version), s 14.  
100 [2000] C.L.C. 1328 
101 ibid at [19]. 
102 ibid at [37]. 
103 [1948] 1 K.B. 223 applied ibid at [39]. 
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capriciously or unreasonably. It followed that Robinson, in using Market Quotation rather 
than Loss, acted unreasonably and in breach of contract.   
The same test informs a different type of challenge to the close out process, based on 
the common law rather than express contractual language. A principle has emerged in the 
common law that, where a contract gives one party discretion to take a decision which affects 
the other, the decision-maker must exercise its discretion in a reasonable or ‘rational’ way.104 
This has been held to mean that the party’s discretion is limited, again following Wednesbury, 
by an implied term that it would not be exercised ‘dishonestly, for an improper purpose, 
capriciously or arbitrarily’.105 As reflected in recent case law, this principle is particularly 
relevant in the close out context because a determining party will usually be required to 
exercise discretion at several different points in the process.  
In one line of cases addressing non-defaulting parties’ duties during close out, the 
courts have described the implications of this test as follows. There are ‘parameters’ defining 
the range of values which might be arrived at if the valuation exercise is conducted ‘honestly 
and rationally’ and within those parameters the valuing party ‘is entitled to have an entirely 
proper regard for any danger to itself from valuing too optimistically’.106 In other words, 
subject to this duty of rationality, the decision is that of the valuing party, not the market or 
the court.107 Euroption v SEB108 confirmed that the valuing party could act in their own 
interests rather than the defaulter’s. Here, the court found that a reasonable person acting 
reasonably could have closed-out as SEB did, even though this did not maximise value for 
Euroption. The judge emphasised that it was not the job of the court to re-run the close out 
process to second guess what might have been done differently. That said, there have been 
examples of valuations falling outside these parameters. In WestLB AG v Nomura Bank 
International Plc, Nomura’s valuation was found to be ‘irrational’.109  Nomura had valued 
the assets by conducting a dealer poll, but it did not know and therefore could not tell the 
                                                          
104 See Socimer v Standard Bank [2008] EWCA Civ 116 at [73] where Rix LJ clarifies that cases such as Abu 
Dhabi National Tanker Company v Product Star Shipping Company Limited [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 397 (‘The 
Product Star’) use ‘reasonably’ to refer to a ‘Wednesbury-type rationality’.  
105 Paragon v Nash [2001] EWCA Civ 1466 at [103]; Socimer v Standard Bank ibid at [66].  
106 See WestLB AG v Nomura Bank International Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 495, at [60]. 
107 See for instance Socimer v Standard Bank n 104 supra, at [112] 
108 Euroption Strategic Fund Ltd v Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB [2012] EWHC 584 (Comm). 
109 WestLB AG v Nomura Bank International Plc [2010] EWHC 2863 (Comm) at [81], upheld in WestLB AG v 
Nomura Bank International Plc n 106 supra.  
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dealers what was in the relevant portfolio. It received no bids. The court proceeded to 
determine what the outcome of a rational valuation process would have been.110  
The duty of rationality should therefore be seen by CCPs as a standard to be observed 
whenever exercising discretion, which will be inevitable during a close out. In particular, it 
should be carefully factored in where the CCP is closing out in unprecedented or otherwise 
challenging market conditions. However, the standard should not ordinarily be unduly 
onerous to meet. It does not prevent a CCP from acting in its own interests when closing out, 
and nor does it allow the court to second-guess the process. In short, if a CCP complies with 
its contractual obligations and exercises its discretion in a way that is ‘honest and rational’, it 
is fully entitled to protect its own interests during the default management process and a 
challenge based on the duty of rationality seems unlikely to be successful.  
 
3.2.3 CCP-specific issues  
In addition to the general challenges considered above, there are several specific issues 
arising in the context of a close out by a CCP.  
First, section 184 of Part VII gives CCPs an indemnity for liability for loss or damage 
from specified acts. For instance, Section 184(3) protects CCPs and their officers and 
employees from liability in damages for anything done or omitted ‘in the discharge or 
purported discharge’ of  ‘…its default rules’, but there is a proviso, ‘unless the act or 
omission is shown to have been in bad faith’. Bad faith includes, but is broader than 
dishonesty, and has been described in a different context as including ‘sharp practice’ which 
may fall short of ‘outright dishonesty’.111 As with commercial reasonableness, transparency 
and good record-keeping of default management decisions and executions will assist here. 
Secondly, one of the rare CCP-specific cases from the English courts demonstrates 
the court’s reluctance to intervene in close outs conducted in compliance with the CCP’s 
rules. Re MF Global UK Limited112 involved an application under section 236 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 brought by joint special administrators of MF Global UK Limited. The 
respondents were two clearing houses which had closed out MF Global’s open positions 
                                                          
110 In fact, the ‘portfolio of mainly unquoted and exotic stocks and shares, at a time of a historic “credit crunch”’ 
was found to have no value ‘other than at most a 5% hope value’: WestLB AG v Nomura Bank International Plc 
n 106 supra, at [61]. 
111 Niru Battery Manufacturing Co v Milestone Trading Ltd [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 705, 741 at [135], per 
Moore-Bick LJ. For a discussion of good faith and contract law, see J Beatson and D Friedman (eds), Good 
Faith and Fault in Contract Law (OUP 2007) and for a valuable discussion of the meaning of bad faith, in the 
context of explaining it as a limit on the change of position defence to restitutionary claims based on mistaken 
payment, see E P Elllinger and others (eds), Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law (5th edn, OUP 2011), 533−534. 
112 [2015] EWHC 2319 (Ch). 
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‘very shortly’ after the appointment of administrators. The purpose of the application was to 
force disclosure so that the administrators could consider if there were grounds for bringing 
proceedings. The case was made more complex by extra-territorial aspects, but essentially the 
court held that difference between the close out prices and screen quotations for the same 
positions one day later was not something that warranted being investigated further. In 
particular, it was not sufficient to justify the administrators’ far-reaching request for 
information about the close out.   
Thirdly, a special feature of close out by CCPs is that a CCP’s terms may provide for 
an auction of the defaulting member’s positions. A successful auction will establish a close 
out valuation and find another member to take on the defaulter’s contracts. Auctions are a 
relatively new feature of CCPs’ default management processes and CCPs usually retain the 
flexibility to organise them in a variety of ways.  In some cases, for example, members may 
be incentivised to provide good bids by rules stating that, after the auction, should there be 
losses to meet from the default fund, the contributions of members who have not submitted 
acceptable bids will be used before those of members who have.113 CCPs also sometimes 
organise auctions where they have discretion about who can participate. As with other aspects 
of close out, therefore, a CCP will have not only to comply with the terms of its agreement 
with members and but also exercise its discretion in a rational way, as discussed above. 
 
3.3 Collateral management 
If, after the close out process outlined above, the CCP faces losses caused by the default of a 
member, it will seek to recover them by using the available financial resources, starting with 
the defaulter’s collateral. Despite the safe harbours in Part VII, the SFR and the FCAR, 
complexities and some risks in this process remain. This section discusses the forms of 
collateral accepted by CCPs and then examines three areas of concern around the use of this 
collateral, explaining how CCPs may respond.  
 
3.3.1 Forms of collateral 
Cash and high quality securities are the standard forms of margin accepted by CCPs.114 Cash 
is typically provided by members to the CCP using a title transfer. This means that outright 
                                                          
113 For example, see the discussion of ‘Auction incentives’ in LCH.Clearnet, ‘CCP Risk, Management, 
Recovery and Resolution: An LCH.Clearnet White Paper’ (undated), 12 available at  
<http://www.swapclear.com/Images/CCP%20Risk%20Management%20Recovery%20and%20Resolution.pdf > 
114 See supra section 2.2 for an explanation of ‘margin’. 
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ownership of the cash is transferred, with the member having a contractual right to redelivery 
of agreed amounts when its debt is discharged. The underlying technical arrangements for the 
transfer of cash are relatively simple: cash is posted to the CCP by book entry, often by using 
a ‘concentration bank’ where both member and CCP hold accounts. In this case, the clearing 
agreement will often give the CCP the right to make a debit transfer from the member’s 
account direct.  
The legal and operational issues surrounding the use of securities as collateral are 
more complex. Modern securities are held in electronic and, therefore, intermediated form.115 
In English law, the concept of a trust is normally used to characterise the links in the custody 
chain between the central securities depositary, custodians, sub-custodians and the ultimate 
investor.116 As Gullifer puts it, describing the use of the trust to analyse these tiers of 
intermediaries, the ‘position in English law is an example of the use of existing concepts’.117 
The use of the trust means that an investor’s interests in securities will be held by its 
custodian as trustee for the investor, and so on along the chain.118 This intermediated chain of 
interests in securities complicates the provision of collateral. There are a number of models of 
posting interests in securities to clearing houses depending on the collateral type and the 
collateral agreement. One common one is shown in Figure 1, where the CCP has an account 
at the central securities depository (‘CSD’), the clearing member’s custodian also has an 
account at the CSD and the clearing member posts the securities as collateral by instructing 
its custodian to transfer the securities into the CCP’s account. 
 
                                                          
115 L Gullifer, ‘The Proprietary Protection of Investors in Intermediated Securities’ in J Armour and J Payne 
(eds), Rationality in Company Law (Hart 2009) discusses the demateralisation of securities following the ‘paper 
crunch’ and, at 223, includes diagrams explaining the holding chains in intermediated securities.  
116 The definitive account of the legal relationships in intermediated securities holdings, and in particular the 
role of trust law therein, is still found in J Benjamin, Interests in Securities (OUP 2000).  
117 Gullifer, n 115 supra, 230.  
118 See for example, the recent discussion of an investor’s rights in securities held in the central securities 
depository, Clearstream, in Secure Capital SA v Credit Suisse AG [2015] EWHC 388 (Comm). Concerns about 
the exercise of investors’ rights in the context of intermediated securities are explored further in E Micheler, 
‘Intermediated Securities and Legal Certainty’ [2014] LSE Law, Society and Economics Working Paper 3 and 
in E Micheler, ‘Custody chains and asset values: Why crypto-securities are worth contemplating’ (2015) 74(3) 









Figure 1: One model of securities margin posting119   
 
Further complexity is added to the intermediated chain by commingling and segregation. The 
former arises where a custodian holds securities in a comingled client account: here the 
accepted legal analysis is that clients in this position will be equitable tenants in common of 
the interests in the commingled account. The trust relationship therefore survives 
commingling, but in practice, each client will be vulnerable to shortfalls caused by losses 
attributed to other clients, so-called ‘fellow client risk’.120 By contrast, ‘segregation’ is used 
to describe arrangements where client assets are held or recorded separately from the 
trustee’s own or ‘house’ assets and sometimes also (depending on the nature of the 
segregation) from the assets of other clients. Degrees of commingling and segregation affect 
each level of the intermediated chain.121 For example, in the CCP context, an interest in a 
security may be segregated at the level of the custodian’s books but not at the depositary 
level. Furthermore, many CCPs now offer clients a menu of different options as to how their 
securities will be held, which are more nuanced than the choices required by Articles 39(2) 
and (3) of EMIR.122 One option, widely used in the US, is a ‘legally separated but 
                                                          
119 This model only works where the CCP can open an account in its own name at the CSD and it can settle 
securities into that account.  If that is not possible or practical, it may need its own settlement bank and 
custodian.  The EMIR regulatory technical standards require that if a CCP can use the CSD direct, it must. 
120 For an analysis of commingling, see M Yates and D Montague, The Law of Global Custody (Bloomsbury 
Professional 2013) sections [3.42]-[3.55]. They characterise the custody relationship, following Hunter v Moss 
and Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd, as one where the custodian holds assets in a comingled client account and the 
clients are equitable tenants in common, with the custodian acting as their trustee.  (Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 
WLR 452 and Re Stapylton Fletcher Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 1181). This is consistent with Brigg J’s description of 
the holding of securities in Re Lehman Brother International (Europe) [2009] EWHC 2545 (Ch). For a 
discussion of shortfalls specifically, see Gullifer, n 115 supra, 245−252. 
121 The FCA’s Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS) rules apply to ‘firms’ holding client money or assets. These 
rules do not apply to CCPs directly, so they are not considered further in this article. However, they may affect 
those CCP members which clear for clients, so there will be an indirect effect on CCPs, and this is reflected in 
the drafting of CASS. For further discussion of amendments to CASS to take account of clearing, see J 
Braithwaite, ‘Legal Perspectives on Client Clearing’ [2015] LSE Law, Society and Economics Working Paper 
4.  
122 EMIR, Articles 39(2) and (3) require that a CCP shall offer ‘omnibus client segregation’ and ‘individual 













operationally commingled’ (‘LSOC’) model.123 Other options offer full segregation for the 
assets of members, or even for the individual clients of members. One CCP explains that, in 
this case, specific assets are ‘tagged’ to an individually segregated account.124 The main 
attraction here is that, should a client’s CCP member fail, its assets could be ‘ported’ or 
transferred to a solvent member with  more speed and certainty than if those assets were in a 
commingled client account.  
The combination of intermediation and various degrees of commingling and 
segregation along the chain of interests in securities creates a complex, if reasonably 
efficient, system of securities holding. In this context, careful drafting of collateral 
arrangements between CCP and member is required to ensure that both parties enjoy exactly 
the rights they intend to rely upon. The various risks examined next are particularly note-
worthy in this context.  
 
3.3.2 Fixed and floating charges 
A CCP may take either a fixed or a floating charge over a member’s financial collateral. The 
defining feature of the latter is the chargor retains control over the collateral until such point 
as the charge ‘crystallises’ or fixes to the asset, for example on a default.125 Until then, the 
chargor may sell, lease, dispose of, or otherwise deal with the asset. This contrasts with a 
fixed charge, where the chargor requires the chargee’s consent to deal with the charged 
asset.126  
There is a risk, which is more acute where the collateral consists of intangible assets 
such as intermediated securities, that a court may recharacterise a collateral arrangement as a 
floating charge. This can happen even when the parties’ agreement gives the charge a 
                                                          
123 The LSOC was adopted by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) by the following rule, 
which also discusses in detail the benefits of the LSOC model compared to other types of segregation: 77(25) 
Fed. Reg. 6336 (February 7, 2012).  
124 See, for example, LCH.Clearnet, ‘LCH.Clearnet Account Structures under EMIR’ (28 January 2014), 6 
available at  
<http://www.lchclearnet.com:8080/Images/account%20structures%20brochure_21%202%2014_v1_tcm6-
63942.pdf > 
125 This was one of the three characteristics of the floating charge set out in Re Yorkshire Woolcombers 
Association Ltd [1903] 2 Ch D 284, confirmed as the defining characteristic by the House of Lords in Re 
Spectrum Plus [2005] 2 A.C. 680, at [95]−[111]. This latter decision established that the ‘essential characteristic 
of a floating charge’ is ‘that the assets subject to the charge is not fully appropriated as security for the 
performance of the debt until the occurrence of some future event. In the meantime the chargor is left free to use 
the charged asset and to remove it from the security.’ Ibid at [111], per Lord Scott.  
126 For a detailed analysis of the differences between fixed and floating charges, see L Gullifer and J Payne, 
Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy (2nd ed, Hart 2015), section 7.3.3.3.  
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different label, for example calling it a fixed charge or even a ‘lien’.127 Such 
recharacterisation matters for several important reasons. Insolvency rules put a floating 
charge holder at a disadvantage compared to the fixed charge holder because they are less 
senior in the order of creditors.128 The proceeds of the assets subject to the floating charge 
will be used to pay the expenses of the liquidation or administration, then preferential 
creditors, and then a ‘prescribed part’ in favour of general creditors129 before then paying the 
floating charge holder. Floating charges can also be set aside by an insolvency administrator 
in some cases.130 Furthermore, there are long-standing difficulties around the FCAR’s 
coverage of floating charges and, should a particular floating charge not qualify under the 
FCAR, it will not be covered by the FCAR’s disapplication of certain insolvency 
legislation131 and it may be void for non-registration.132  
The FCAR expressly protect ‘security financial collateral arrangements’, which are 
defined in Regulation 3(1) as involving, inter alia, the creation of a ‘security interest’ where 
the financial collateral is ‘in the possession or under the control of the collateral-taker or a 
person acting on its behalf…’ The same Regulation defines a ‘security interest’ as ‘including’ 
pledges, mortgages, fixed charges and ‘a charge created as a floating charge’. This definition 
confirms that in the case of a floating charge, the financial collateral must ‘be in the 
possession or under the control of the collateral-taker or a person acting on its behalf …’ To 
date, two cases have considered how this requirement works in the context of a floating 
charge, though both considered the language as it stood before a 2010 amendment, which is 
discussed further below. The two cases are Gray v G-T-P Group Ltd133 and Re Lehman 
                                                          
127 In Re Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (In administration) [2012] EWHC 2997 (Ch) the parties’ 
agreement stated that the chargor was providing a ‘lien’ over intermediated securities but this arrangement was 
recharacterised as a floating charge. More commonly, the cases have seen fixed charges recharacterised as 
floating, see, e.g., Re Spectrum Plus [2005] 2 A.C. 680, where the charge was described in the parties’ 
documentation as ‘specific’ which here was intended to mean ‘fixed’, as described at [79].  
128 The immediate issue at stake in Re Spectrum Plus was whether the bank holding the charge would rank 
before or after preferential creditors. Under Insolvency Act 1986, s. 175 a fixed charge would see the chargee 
bank paid before the preferential creditors, but a floating charge would mean that the preferential creditors (the 
Inland Revenue, etc.) have their claims met before the bank. Re Spectrum Plus, ibid at [76].  
129 Insolvency Act 1986, s 176A. The priority of liquidation or administration expenses over preferential claims 
is provided for by s 176ZA, and preferential claims dealt with by s 175.  
130 Under Insolvency Act 1986, s 245, floating charges created in the run-up to insolvency are set aside, unless 
for new value.  Moreover under paragraph 70 of Schedule B1 of the same Act, an administrator has the power to 
dispose of floating charges without the leave of the court.  See Gullifer and Payne, n 126 supra. 
131 Including under FCAR, Regulation 10. 
132 Qualifying security financial collateral arrangements are exempted from certain formalities including the 
requirement to register a charge under the Companies Act 2006; FCAR, Regulation 4. 
133 [2010] EWHC 1772 (Ch). 
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Brothers International (Europe) in administration134 and in both, the floating charges in 
question were held to fall outside the FCAR. The former case was a short hearing on a 
relatively low value matter, though, in a sign of the importance of this issue in practice, the 
decision still provoked extensive market concern.135 The latter case involved a more lengthy 
hearing including extensive submissions from counsel on the substantive law and as a result, 
the judgment offers a comprehensive analysis of the legislation and of the background to it. 
This decision diverged from Gray in that in the Lehman case, Briggs J held that it was 
technically possible to have ‘possession’ of intangible assets such as interests in securities for 
the purpose of the FCAR.136 In Re LBIE, the charge in question, having been recharacterised 
as a floating charge, was held to fall outside the FCAR because of a lack of ‘possession or 
control’ by the collateral taker. This was the case even though the collateral was held in an 
account in the name of the collateral taker, because of the extent of the powers that the 
collateral provider had to withdraw it (or in the judge’s words, ‘do what it liked with the 
property’137) without reference to the liabilities owed by the collateral provider.  
 After amendments in 2010,138 regulation 3(2) of the FCAR defines ‘possession’ to 
include the situation where the collateral is put in an account in the name of the collateral 
taker, but this definition is subject to an unhelpful proviso: ‘provided that any rights the 
collateral-provider may have in relation to that financial collateral are limited to the right to 
substitute financial collateral of the same or greater value or to withdraw excess financial 
collateral.’ This definition has been criticised for being too vague, in particular about the 
extent of the powers that a collateral provider may retain to decide what is ‘excess’ collateral 
before ‘possession’ is lost.139 Indeed, looking obiter at these amendments in the Lehman case, 
Briggs J commented that ‘[c]ritics of the outcome and analysis in Gray may be forgiven for 
                                                          
134 n 127 supra. This case was heard after the FCAR amendments, but considered the unamended FCAR, as 
noted by Briggs J: ‘… it is the FCARs in their original form which is material for present purposes.’ Re LBIE, 
ibid at [83]. 
135 For example, the Financial Markets Law Committee called it ‘an unwelcome precedent at a crucial time.’ 
FMLC, ‘Issue 87−Control: Gray v G-T-P Group Ltd’ (December 2010), at [4.13]. Available at  
<http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/6/5/8/26584807/issue87_fmlc_paper_decemeber_2010.pdf > 
136 Re LBIE n 127 supra, at [131]. 
137 ibid at [147]. 
138 The Financial Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality and Financial Collateral Arrangements) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2010/2993, which came into force in April 2011, added the new definition of 
‘possession’.   
139 See Gullifer and Payne, n 126 supra, section 7.3.4.2. Note that in Re LBIE n 127 supra this issue of ‘excess’ 
was complicated by the fact that LBF had created a charge in favour of LBIE with respect to sums owed by LBF 
to LBIE and to LBIE’s affiliates.  
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having thought that this proviso gave with one hand but took as much away with the 
other.’140 Professor Gullifer agrees that ‘the scope of the FCARs still remains unclear’.141  
 The first European Court of Justice decision on the EU financial collateral regime is 
pending at the time of writing. The matter concerns the validity of a bank’s charge over cash 
deposited in a customer’s current account. The Opinion of Advocate-General Szpunar was 
delivered with respect to this case in July 2016 and, on ‘possession’ and ‘control’, it confirms 
that the meaning of the terms is ‘problematic’.142 Citing Gray and Re LBIE, the Advocate 
General agrees with the line taken by the English courts that ‘being in the possession or under 
the control of the collateral taker must mean that the collateral taker not only has practical 
control over the account to which the collateral relates, but also has the right to prevent the 
withdrawal of cash by the collateral provider in so far as is necessary to guarantee the 
necessary obligations.’143 In the absence of such ‘legal control’, the arrangement in question 
would therefore fall outside the financial collateral regime, as the Advocate General indicated 
was likely in the matter before the ECJ on this occasion.144  
In practice, if intermediated securities remain in an account in the name of the CCP at 
the CSD (as illustrated in (Figure 1) supra) and the member only has the right to substitute or 
withdraw ‘excess’ collateral, which is defined in the contract,145 without the permission of the 
taker, the risk of a floating charge falling outside the FCAR will be minimised. On the other 
hand, if the member retains more extensive rights over the collateral, this may introduce 
uncertainty on this very important point. 
 
3.3.3 Conflicts of law 
Intermediated securities often introduce different jurisdictions into what may already be a 
cross-border transaction, and they thereby intensify the conflict of law issues which have to 
be managed by a CCP. The absence of a consensus about how to work out which law applies 
to intermediated holdings in securities, coupled with the lack of consistency between 
                                                          
140 Re LBIE n 127 supra, at [126]. 
141 L Gullifer n 10 supra, 380.  
142 Private Equity Insurance Group SIA v Swedbank AS Case C-156/15, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar 
(21 July 2016), at [43]. This case concerns the EU Directive 2002/47/EC on financial collateral arrangements, 
which was implemented in the UK by the FCAR.  
143 ibid at [51].  
144 ibid at [52].  
145 Gullifer and Payne comment that there is an argument that parties should have freedom of contract to define 
‘excess collateral’ for themselves, but the limits to what they can agree remain unclear.  Gullifer and Payne, n 
126 supra, 314. 
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domestic laws, creates legal uncertainty and, potentially, risks around the enforcement of a 
CCP’s rights.  
The default rule for property rights is that the applicable law will be that of the place 
where the property is located (lex situs). This rule is straightforward to apply with traditional 
forms of securities. For bearer instruments, for example, the governing law would be the law 
of the physical location of the securities. The situation is not straightforward, however, where 
there is a chain of interests in securities represented by book entries in accounts, and this 
problem continues to command a good deal of attention from stake holders.  
One approach to this problem that has gained traction in financial markets legislation 
is ‘PRIMA’, or the application of the law of the ‘place of the relevant intermediary account’.  
This approach determines the law of each link in the intermediated holding chain by looking 
at the relationship between account holder and account provider. The PRIMA approach was 
adopted by the Hague Conference,146 and in slightly different form by the FCAR and the 
SFR.147  It ensures that only one law governs securities in each account. The shortcomings of 
the approach, however, include that it may be difficult to agree where an account is 
maintained in some cases, and that different governing laws will apply to different parts of 
the chain of interests in securities. Moreover, choice of law rules such as PRIMA do not 
harmonise the underlying substantive laws, so they do not ensure that a given process is 
treated in the same way in all jurisdictions.148 There has, of course, been some progress on 
harmonisation of substantive law relating to securities at an EU level. The FCD has achieved 
regional harmonisation of rules relating to collateralisation, further underlining the point 
made above that it will be very important to ensure that a CCP’s collateral arrangements are 
covered by this regime.  Moreover, while UNIDROIT developed the Geneva Convention on 
Substantive Rules for Intermediated Securities to address many of the issues we have 
discussed,149 it has not yet been signed by any states apart from Bangladesh. Therefore, 
                                                          
146 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the law applicable to certain rights in respect 
of securities held with an intermediary (2006).  The convention has not been signed by any members of the EU. 
147 See in particular FCAR, Regulation 19, where it is referred to as the ‘standard test’, and SFR, Regulation 23. 
The PRIMA test in this legislation differs from that in the Hague Convention where the law of the account is the 
law agreed by the parties (Hague Convention, Article 4 (Primary rule)). In the FCAR and SFR, the law of the 
account is the law of the country where the relevant account is maintained, or (for SFR purposes) where the 
register or central deposit system is maintained.  
148 Conflicts of law and substantive legal issues relating to intermediated securities holdings in the EU are 
discussed in detail in P Paech, Intermediated Securities and Conflict of Laws, (14 June 2014) Paper given at 
Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford 16 May 2014, available at  
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2451030  
149 See H Kanda and others, Official Commentary on the UNIDROIT Convention on Substantive Rules for 
Intermediated Securities (OUP 2012).  
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despite some regional progress, the substantive rules governing interests in securities remain 
fragmented, creating the potential for incompatibility and uncertainty. 
 
3.3.4 Notice and knowledge 
A CCP’s rights over collateral may also be compromised by its notice or knowledge of 
certain facts, for example, if it is aware that a member is using client assets as its own or of 
other breaches of duty along the intermediated chain. A CCP may, as a result, find itself 
liable to third parties (e.g., the clients of clearing members) for personal and proprietary 
claims. 
‘Notice’ determines ‘whether a person takes property subject to or free from some 
equity’.150 In particular, in this context, if assets transferred to the CCP were the traceable 
proceeds of misused client funds and if the CCP had notice of the wrongdoing, the client may 
have a proprietary remedy against the financial resources held by the CCP. Notably, the test 
for having notice is broader than actual notice, i.e., a party may have constructive notice of a 
fact where it failed to make the proper inquiries ‘suggested by the facts at his disposal’.151  
The consequences of ‘knowledge’ are different, but also potentially severe, as it may 
mean that a party is held personally liable as a constructive trustee. For a CCP, it may lead to 
liability for knowing receipt, which is established where the defendant beneficially receives 
property (such as financial collateral) disposed of in breach of fiduciary duty and has 
knowledge that the assets it received are traceable to such a breach.152 A CCP in this case 
would be liable to compensate the beneficiary (e.g., the client of the member) for its losses 
from the member’s breach of trust. As the client’s claim against the CCP would be a personal 
one, it would not matter if the CCP no longer had the assets in question. Further, a CCP may, 
in extreme circumstances, become liable for dishonest assistance. This does not require the 
CCP to have received the assets in question, but requires that the CCP was accessory to or 
                                                          
150 Re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch 264, 278 per Sir Robert Megarry V-C, defining and 
distinguishing ‘notice’ and ‘knowledge’.  
151 In practice, while there is extensive case law on this issue, it will be a matter of fact in each case.  As Lord 
Sumption put it in a recent Privy Council decision finding that a bank did have constructive notice of 
impropriety, these questions ‘are often highly sensitive to their legal and factual context’. Crédit Agricole 
Corporation and Investment Bank v Papadimitriou [2015] UKPC 13. Professor Bridge notes, however, that the 
courts have been reluctant to ‘to import the doctrine of constructive notice in to commercial dealings’ [footnote 
omitted]. M Bridge, Personal Property Law (4th ed, OUP 2015), 225.  
152 The elements of knowing receipt were set out by Hoffmann LJ in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1994] 
2 All ER 685, 700. The question of knowledge proved controversial in the case law, but it does not require 
dishonesty. It was held by the Court of Appeal in BCCI v Akindele [2001] Ch 437, 455 per Nourse LJ, that the 
‘recipient’s state of knowledge must be such as to make it unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the 




assisted with the member’s breach of trust and is deemed to have been ‘dishonest’, which, 
after Twinsectra v Yardley153 and the Privy Council’s decision in Barlow Clowes 
International Ltd v Eurotrust International Ltd,154 is a ‘predominantly objective’ test.155 This 
liability would also lead to a personal claim to make good the clients’ losses.  
Statutory safe harbours may also be compromised by a CCP’s notice or knowledge. 
The carve-out of the indemnity for CCPs’ actions for ‘bad faith’ has already been noted 
above.156 Various other parts of Part VII are also qualified if the CCP has notice of certain 
facts. Section 177 of Part VII, for example, states that a CCP may apply margin 
‘notwithstanding any prior equitable interest or right, or any right or remedy arising from a 
breach of fiduciary duty unless the … clearing house had notice of the interest, right or 
breach of duty at the time the property was provided as margin.’ The SFR disapply the notice 
provisions of sections 163, 164 and 175 of Part VII, but this only applies to a) ‘a market 
contract which is also a transfer order through a [CCP]’ and b) ‘a market charge which is also 
a collateral security charge.’ Part 177, however, is not disapplied.  
These types of claims have not yet been raised before the English courts in the CCP 
context.157 However, the clearing mandate will increase the use of client clearing, and with it 
CCPs’ potential exposures to clients as third parties. Given the potential severity of the 
consequences, awareness of these types of claims is therefore important for CCPs. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
It is difficult to imagine a more systemically important context for default management than 
central clearing, especially in light of the clearing mandate being implemented in the G20 and 
beyond. Against this background, drawing out the issues which arise along a timeline of a 
clearing member’s default enables us to evaluate the applicable law in a rigorous and 
constructive way. The picture which emerges is of a generally supportive, but in some 
                                                          
153 [2002] 2 AC 164 (HL) 
154 [2006] 1 All ER 333 (PC).  
155 Described as such in Abou-Rahmah v Abacha [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 115, at [66] and [94], discussed in 
Ellinger’s Modern Banking Law n 111 supra, 286. 
156 There is also an indemnity under Part VII, s 184(1), which applies to actions relating to ‘property of a 
defaulter’, but this is limited to where the CCP ‘believes and has reasonable grounds for believing that he is 
entitled to take this action’.  
157 Though the question of CCPs’ notice has been raised by a commentator discussing a case which was settled 
before trial, which concerned the ownership of T-bills transferred intra-group between US and UK entities and 
then posted by the UK entity to various clearing houses. A Lenon QC, ‘An unresolved collateral issue: Re MF 
Global UK Ltd and the ownership of US Treasury Bills posted as margin’ [July/August 2014] Butterworth’s 
Journal of International Banking and Finance Law 433, 434 discussing the preliminary hearing Re MF Global 
UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 3415 (Ch).  
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respects, fragile legal framework which has been further complicated by extensive post-crisis 
regulatory reforms, including new rules imposing the clearing mandate, reforming the 
insolvency and resolution regimes, and overhauling the regime for the governance of CCPs. 
The analysis above also demonstrates how this legal framework is variously affected by 
developments in different parts of the financial system. In some respects, as in the case of the 
implied duty of rationality, case law from other sectors opens up new risks for CCPs. In other 
respects, such as in the design of close out valuations, CCPs may draw valuable lessons from 
more battle-tested markets.  
Ultimately, we have shown that even in a context where parties are highly 
sophisticated, deploy standard terms, draw on case law from other markets and enjoy some of 
the most extensive safe harbours in the financial system, there remains the potential for legal 
challenge on various grounds. CCP default management procedures are, after all, a complex 
part of a complex industry. As we have explained, some challenges may be mitigated by the 
parties’ careful drafting, for example of collateral arrangements over intermediated securities, 
of Events of Default notice periods, and of the CCP’s right to exercise discretion. Further, 
CCP ‘fire drills’ should include operational details such as giving appropriate notice because 
by so doing, CCPs will mitigate some of the legal pitfalls associated with the basic 
contractual aspects of default management.  
Other challenges, however, are for legislators. These challenges arise primarily 
because the legislation governing this aspect of the financial market infrastructure has 
become highly piecemeal. The diverse definitions of default rules, the meaning of 
‘substantive obligations’ for the purpose of the stays of contractual rights during resolution 
and the gaps in the financial collateral regime remain matters for law-makers to address, and 
for CCPs and their members to navigate as vigilantly as possible in the meantime.  
 
 
